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Abstract
The global demand for artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT) has grown sharply since its recommendation
by the World Health Organization in 2002. However, a combination of financing and programmatic uncertainties,
limited suppliers of finished products, information opacity across the different tiers in the supply chain, and
widespread fluctuations in raw material prices have together contributed to a market fraught with demand and
supply uncertainties and price volatility. Various short-term solutions have been deployed to alleviate supply
shortages caused by these challenges; however, new mechanisms are required to build resilience into the supply
chain. This review concludes that a mix of strategies is required to stabilize the artemisinin and ACT market. First,
better and more effective pooling of demand and supply risks and better contracting to allow risk sharing among
the stakeholders are needed. Physical and financial buffer stocks will enable better matching of demand and supply
in the short and medium term. Secondly, physical buffers will allow stable supplies when there are procurement
and supply management challenges while financial buffer funds will address issues around funding disruptions.
Finally, in the medium to long term, significant investments in country level system strengthening will be required
to minimize national level demand uncertainties. In addition a voluntary standard for extractors to ensure
appropriate purchasing and sales practices as well as minimum quality and ethical standards could help stabilize
the artemisinin market in the long term.
Keywords: Artemisinin, Artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT), Safety stock, Buffer stock, Physical buffers,
Financial buffers
Background
Since artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT) was
recommended as the first-line treatment of uncompli-
cated malaria in April 2002 by the World Health
Organization (WHO), demand for it has grown sharply
[1]. In 2005, WHO [2,3] indicated that demand increased
from two million treatment courses in 2003 to 30 million
in 2004, to an estimated 70 million in 2005, and a pro-
jected 287 million in 2011. By 2011, 84 countries and ter-
ritories, including all countries in Africa, had adopted
ACT as their first-line treatment of Plasmodium falcip-
arum malaria [4]. Notwithstanding these policy changes,
the rates at which endemic countries have scaled-up the
use of ACT have varied, resulting in demand growth
which has been difficult to predict accurately.
The global demand for ACT has remained unstable
mainly because of financing and programmatic uncer-
tainties. On the other hand, long lead times, a market
structure with too few manufacturers at some stages of
the production cycle and too many at others as well as
information opacity across the different tiers in the sup-
ply chain, have led to poor matching of demand with
supply. This increasing demand variability moving
up the supply chain has created a “bullwhip effect” [5]
and the resulting demand and supply imbalances have
resulted in widespread fluctuations in raw material
prices and in some cases global ACT shortages. In an
ideal environment, good country-level data would enable
an accurate global-level forecast; however, lacking this
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data, global forecasts are often based on an intention to
procure or projections of donor funds available rather
than actual purchases. New initiatives such as the
UNITAID-funded ACT forecasting consortium have
achieved higher levels of global forecast accuracy than
before [6]. However, the current limitations on available
information about future funding for ACT impede their
ability to improve the accuracy of forecasts far enough
in advance to benefit those stakeholders in the supply
chain that need them. In years when poor forecasts have
contributed to ACT shortage this further reduced the
ability to procure the planned quantities. Similarly, in
years when there was an over-forecast, it led to over pro-
duction and decreased prices for raw material resulting
in lower overall production in the following years. This
cycle of instability has been a hallmark of the ACT sup-
ply chain since its adoption.
The number of ACT treatment courses procured by
the public sector has increased significantly from 11
million in 2005 to 181 million in 2010. ACT demand
in 2011 was estimated to be close to 287 million
treatments, an increase of 32% over the previous year
[4]. Demand has also risen with the introduction of
subsidized ACT in the private sector by the Afford-
able Medicines Facility for malaria (AMFm) [7].
While global demand has grown, the raw material
supply market has remained unstable, and there have
been reports of significantly lengthened lead times for
the delivery of ACT in some years as well as national
level stock-outs [7,8]. Short-term solutions have been
deployed, such as diversion of shipments to high-risk
countries by the United States President’s Malaria Ini-
tiative (PMI) and WHO’s ACT supply task force, but
new mechanisms are required to ensure better de-
mand and supply matching and to build resilience
into the supply chain. Several initiatives have begun
to discuss the use of potential “safety nets” to ensure
an uninterrupted supply of prequalified ACT [9,10].
However, a detailed and rigorous analysis of the avail-
able and feasible options is lacking. This paper
attempts to fill that gap.
Challenges and the history of the global ACT
supply chain
Artemisia annua, the plant source for artemisinin, is culti-
vated mainly in China, which with Vietnam, produces
approximately 80% of the global supply; East Africa
producing nearly all of the remaining 20% [9,10]. It takes
about eight months for artemisia to reach full growth
and after harvest, dried leaves are sent to artemisinin-
extraction facilities [11]. Typically, an extractor con-
tracts with a large number of small farmers for its supply.
Specialized active pharmaceutical ingredient (API) manu-
facturers, or in some cases, the finished product manufac-
turers convert artemisinin into its derivatives—artemether,
artesunate, or dihydroartemisinin—and manufacture the
finished product. Figure 1 illustrates the timeline from
planting to availability of final product.
The fragmentation of the extraction and API manufac-
turing market reduces current operating efficiency,
which leads to higher transaction costs and amplifies
demand uncertainty [12]. In addition, signals to growers
and particularly extractors on potential shortages or
scarcity of raw material could lead to considerable
market disruptions including artemisinin price increases
and gouging, as well as product hoarding. This could
lead to ACT supply constraints, country level stock-outs
and, ultimately, increased finished product prices.
Currently, there are only seven WHO prequalified
manufacturers of finished ACT [13]. Global ACT supply
issues are caused by a multitude of factors such as limited
availability of artemisinin (starting material) and active
pharmaceutical ingredient (API), uncertain and fragmen-
ted demand for the products, leading to poor forecasts
financing delays or shortfalls, and inadequate manufactur-
ing capacity. Uncertain demand results in manufacturers
not using their full manufacturing capacity to produce
ACT throughout the year. Although manufacturing cap-
acity may seem adequate on an annual basis, an unstable
ordering pattern means that manufacturers may allocate
production capacity to other products making them un-
able to fulfill their total annual manufacturing capacity [R.
Cazetien, personal communication].
Figure 1 Timeline from planting to availability of final product.
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ACT was considered as a viable option for first-line
treatment of uncomplicated malaria when a 2001 agreement
between WHO and Novartis sought to make CoartemW
(artemether-lumefantrine) available at cost to ministries
of health in developing nations. This agreement allowed
WHO to generate global demand forecasts while provid-
ing Novartis with a four-month lead time on all orders
[14-16]. Initially these forecasts were too low and in No-
vember 2004, WHO announced a shortfall in the supply
of CoartemW due to a lack of raw material [16].
Increased production in China and Africa eased this
shortage, but then resulted in an oversupply in 2007 and
a significant decrease in prices [16]. As a result, many
growers of Artemisia annua switched to crops with a
more dependable demand level.
In July 2008, the Clinton Foundation entered into an
agreement with several Chinese and Indian manufac-
turers that would set price ceilings for artemisinin
extractors and help stabilize ACT prices [17]. Separately,
a new initiative called the Assured Artemisinin Supply
System (A2S2) was created in 2009 to increase artemisi-
nin supply to meet the projected ACT demand in 2010–
2012 [8,9]. A2S2 was based on a tripartite financing
model where extractors who had existing contracts with
WHO-prequalified ACT manufacturers received loan-
based pre-financing. The idea was that front-loading the
financing would help increase supply and create “fair
prices” on the market. However, neither of the interven-
tions has successfully stabilized prices [8,18].
Recent concerns about longer supply lead times on
ACT orders led WHO and Roll Back Malaria (RBM) to
convene a meeting in September 2011 where partici-
pants concluded that the ACT supply was tight, artemisi-
nin prices were soaring, and that there was a need to
closely monitor stock levels particularly in countries at
risk of shortage. As a result, WHO created the multi-
partner ACT Supply Task Force which has been working
to ensure that in times of tight supply, country level stock
outs can be prevented through better planning and stock
reallocation [7].
Challenges, with the ACT supply chain in malaria-endemic
countries
In-country stock-outs result from challenges in procure-
ment, distribution, disbursement delays or supply short-
falls. Currently, countries deal with stock-outs in a
largely ad hoc manner. Typically, when a country identi-
fies or anticipates a stock-out, it requests a donor or
partner organization to provide ACT stock or short-
term financing to procure it. Donors and partners
respond in a number of ways to prevent treatment dis-
ruptions: countries often transfer stock between districts
or facilities to avoid stock-outs or prevent product ex-
piry. Transfer between countries has been implemented
among a number of Latin American countries [19] how-
ever, this is less common elsewhere. Mechanisms such
as the Coordinated Procurement Planning Initiative
comprised of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tubercu-
losis and Malaria (Global Fund) and a number of part-
ners have been established to develop a joint and
collaborative response to potential and actual stock-outs
for HIV commodities [20].
Poor matching of demand and supply, financial flow
uncertainty, and poor country level estimates of demand
also contribute to the cycle of instability. Although
discussed separately below, the three are interlinked,
and problems in one contribute and lead to problems in
the others.
Financial delays
A large number of countries rely on Global Fund finan-
cing for procuring ACT [21]. Public sector procurement
using Global Fund grants contributes to more than 1/3
of the global ACT market [22]. A major financial reason
for unpredictable ACT country demand is funding gaps
caused by delays in disbursement by donors such as
the Global Fund. Lengthy cycles for grant review and
approval, delayed responses from the Principal Recipient
on disbursement requests and progress updates, and
linking disbursements for commodity procurement to
poor grant performance contribute to delayed grant dis-
bursement and tardy procurement [23,25].
An assessment of Global Fund grants by the African
Leaders Malaria Alliance (ALMA) illustrated that fund-
ing delays consistently led to procurement delays of mal-
aria commodities in at least nine countries in 2011 [M.
Renshaw, personal communication]. Key delays have
been related to grant signature, grant consolidation, and
transitioning to phase 2 of grants. Other reports have
noted delays with quarterly disbursements due to issues
with the reporting of performance indicators [26]. For
example, in Uganda, no disbursements were made from
May 2010 to June 2011 leading to widespread ACT
stock-outs. In Mali, PMI averted a stock-out caused by
delays in grant consolidation and signature leading to
disbursement delays by placing an emergency ACT
order. An analysis of PMI procurements carried out by
the USAID | DELIVER PROJECT between October
2007 and October 2011 revealed that PMI funded the
procurement of 54.3 million ACT treatments to fill
Global Fund and other donor funding gaps [L. Hare,
personal communication].
Many countries rely on resources being disbursed within
six months after grant approval, and according to the Glo-
bal Fund’s policies, the signature process cannot extend be-
yond one year. However, on average, it takes at least 340
days [28] from the time of grant approval to grant signa-
ture, resulting in procurement and programmatic delays.
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For example, in Ghana, the delay in receipt of funds from
both the Round 5 Rolling Continuation Channel and
Round 8 caused delays of up to 12 months in indoor
residual spraying (IRS) and long-lasting insecticide treated
net (LLIN) prevention programmes as well as in the rollout
of community case management of malaria [27]. The
Global Fund Board at its meeting in November 2012
recommended that the AMFm will also be incorporated
into the existing grant mechanism, which may add to the
uncertainties of funding flows for procurement of
ACT [28].
In-country procurement and supply chain management
challenges
Inefficient procurement and supply chain management
processes in countries lead to challenges with reporting
and meeting targets, which also add to Global Fund
grant disbursement delays. A study carried out by the
Roll Back Malaria Procurement and Supply Management
Working Group estimated that the average time taken
to complete the steps in procurement until a purchase
order was placed was six months for malaria commod-
ities [29]. Furthermore, the procurement process can
be complicated by corruption in some countries; in
2011, 12 grants were investigated by the Global Fund
Office of the Inspector General for poor procurement
practices [30].
Despite recent commitments by partners and coun-
tries to strengthen the supply chains and to improve
ACT forecasting, challenges remain because of inherent
weaknesses, in the health system including poor stock
management and warehousing; inconsistent, inaccurate,
or unavailable data for forecasting and decision-making;
and weak human resource capacity and program coord-
ination [31]. The absence of functioning management
information systems also impedes the early detection of
stock-outs. Idiosyncrasies of the product itself, including
short shelf life and a requirement to order ACT
packs according to patient weight, are additional
complications.
Fluctuating demand
The epidemiology of malaria is changing rapidly because
of effective malaria control interventions. Several reviews
[32] have demonstrated that ACT scale-up and vector
control measures such as IRS and LLINs have reduced
parasite transmission and malaria cases in many coun-
tries. Furthermore, many countries are scaling-up diag-
nostic testing programmes for malaria with microscopy
or rapid diagnostic tests. However, the proportions of
cases that undergo diagnostic testing and are subse-
quently treated with ACT are not well documented.
The quantifiable short- and medium-term effect of
these interventions on the demand for ACT is, therefore,
unclear [33].
Natural disasters including changing rainfall patterns,
floods, droughts, and epidemics also give rise to uncer-
tainties. For example, Kenya has recently experienced
the worst drought in 60 years, which resulted in malaria
outbreaks in the arid north and highlands when the
rains returned. This sudden increase in demand led to a
delayed delivery of ACT and stock-outs at all levels as
manufacturers had not planned for these sudden orders
[7]. Figure 2 illustrates the vicious cycle of demand and
supply uncertainty in the ACT supply chain perpetuated
by supply chain challenges at the country level.
Strategies to cope with demand and supply uncertainty
in the ACT market
While several of the nuances in the ACT supply chain
are unique, the situation of matching supply with
demand in environments with high uncertainty trans-
lates to many other products and geographical contexts.
Approaches that can be used to address the demand and
supply uncertainty in the ACT supply chain are pre-
sented below along with a discussion of the pros and
cons of each approach. In addition to short and medium
term options, some long term options are also analysed
that could help stabilize the artemisinin market. The
options are illustrated in Additional file 1.
Effective pooling of demand and supply risks
The volatility in ACT demand is greater at the individual
country level as compared to a region with multiple
countries. A supply chain can better manage demand
volatility by aggregating demand across multiple custo-
mers or geographical areas thereby smoothing short-
term ordering fluctuations. Similarly, the impact of
supply uncertainty is greater when there is a single sup-
plier. During instances of oscillating demand, pooling
products from multiple suppliers can lead to better match-
ing. Using careful planning to match demand and supply
has proven beneficial in several pooled procurement initia-
tives [34-36]. Although the Global Fund Voluntary Pooled
Procurement mechanism was created to achieve such be-
nefits, it has not been able to achieve its full potential be-
cause of partial implementation. The Global Fund now
intends to “fully” implement VPP including opt-out instead
of opt-in mechanisms [37].
Rolling horizon forecast /volume commitments
A rolling horizon forecast commitment requires funding
agencies such as the Global Fund to commit to manu-
facturers to purchase a certain quantity of the product
over two-three years with some flexibility in updating
the commitment as new information becomes available.
In return for the flexible purchase commitment, the
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manufacturers would guarantee a maximum allowed
lead-time, upside purchase flexibility, and lower prices.
Explicit contractual penalties are defined for the manu-
facturer if it cannot meet either its lead-time commit-
ment or the upside supply guarantee. Thus, the funding
agency reduces its risk of supply shortage and price un-
certainty by undertaking some of the demand uncer-
tainty risk [38-40]. Volume commitments from funding
agencies to manufacturers would result in more equit-
able sharing of the risk from demand uncertainty
across the different stakeholders in the supply chain
(e.g., ACT manufacturers, funders, country govern-
ments, extractors and API manufacturers) [39,40]. In
some cases volume commitments would enable a
switch in the manufacturer’s production paradigm
from “make to order” to “make to stock” resulting in
reduced lead times.
The level of flexibility in the commitments at each
stage and any contractual penalties need to be chosen
carefully based on a thorough analysis of the forecast
certainty and risk aversion ability. The manufacturer
would continue to experience risk associated with exact
timing of order placement within the year, although the
concept of a demand-driven supply network described
in the following sections attempts to minimize some of
this risk. A rigorous mathematical analysis of rolling
horizon forecast commitments used for non-health com-
modities can be found in Anupindi and Bassok [41]. The
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) uses similar
contracting arrangements called long-term arrangements
where solid forecasts are established between manufac-
turers and UNICEF with some flexibility in changing
them [42-45].
In some cases the funding agencies may themselves
not have a predictable multi-year financing stream in
order for them to make future volume commitments to
manufacturers. Additionally, the nature of the ACT mar-
ket is very dynamic; new ACT formulations and new
types of anti-malarials as well as new manufacturers
enter the market space every few years and prices have
fluctuated significantly. This has made some buyers re-
luctant to make multi-year purchase commitments due
to the perception that this may leave them with fewer
degrees of freedom.
Figure 2 Vicious cycle of demand and supply uncertainty in the ACT supply chain perpetuated by supply chain challenges at the
country level.
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Global supply hubs/physical buffer stock
Holding some ACT inventory in a central location to fill
orders that have a short lead-time allows some decoup-
ling between the fluctuations in ACT demand and the
uncertainties in ACT supply. Buffer stocks can be held
by manufacturers or third parties and can be either ro-
tating or non-rotating. Rotating product buffers provide
the benefits of short lead times, risk pooling,
discounted pricing, and a low risk of product expiry, but
can be challenging to implement. Non-rotating emer-
gency buffers are easy to establish and enable rapid
response; however, they also present a high risk of expiry
if the amount of stock is not estimated properly.
Typically, manufacturer-held buffers have the lowest
cost and best shelf life and are particularly effective
with products with cold chain requirements. Holding
buffers at an upstream level in the supply chain leads
to lower total inventory costs due to statistical aggrega-
tion of uncertainty as well as lower costs of warehousing
and inventory holding at the manufacturer warehouse.
However, manufacturers are often reluctant to assume
liability for stock, especially without guaranteed fund-
ing or the existence of a secondary market if
demand is lower than expected. To ensure an effective
manufacturer-held buffer, funding must be secure or
guaranteed. Also, in instances where a mix of products
is required, holding buffer stock across multiple manu-
facturers introduces an additional layer of complexity
requiring countries to receive multiple shipments for
each order which increases transit costs and the risk of
product loss and delays.
With a third-party buffer stock, the initial stockpile is
financed using a rolling working capital fund that is
replenished when orders are placed. The supply hub
would carry inventory from all WHO pre-qualified man-
ufacturers in proportion to their market share in the last
year and would be located in a region that provides easy
logistical access to malaria-endemic countries. The
manufacturers would then replenish the stocks at the
supply hub as orders deplete it. This implies that a
higher fraction of the supply chain will be demand driven
and not based on a forecast alone, and manufacturers
would not wait for production activities to start after the
order is received. To avoid any contractual penalties sti-
pulated in the rolling horizon forecast commitment, the
manufacturers will continue to hold inventory. On the
other hand, because of short shelf life, holding excess in-
ventory will be expensive for the manufacturer. These
two forces together will incentivize the manufacturers to
hold the optimal quantity of stock creating the balance
required to match supply with demand in the short-term.
A regionally located inventory can also result in lower
transport costs and lead to better preparedness for
any time-sensitive, short-term demand spikes that may
require more than one supply source, such as a malaria
epidemic. Such stockpiles and buffers have been success-
fully used by PEPFAR/SCMS [46-48] for HIV medicines,
PMI for ACT [49], the Global Drug Facility (GDF) for
Multi Drug Resistant Tuberculosis (MDR-TB) medicines
[50] and UNICEF for multiple vaccines [43-45].
Physical buffers are not difficult to manage and pro-
vide the ability for short lead times while allowing price
advantages from pooled procurement; however, coun-
tries can become dependent on the stockpile and place
all orders as emergencies. There is anecdotal evidence
from some of the above initiatives that normal procure-
ment constitutes only a small percent of all pro-
curement, while the remainder goes to replenish the
stockpiles for emergency orders. Furthermore, although
manufacturers are more likely to agree to hold buffer
stocks when they share the risk of product surpluses
additional mechanisms to ensure timely delivery of pro-
ducts should be established.
Because of the long production cycle for ACT, a fun-
damental question is which stage of the supply chain the
buffer inventory should be held—artemisinin harvest,
API, or finished product? The answer depends on who
pays for the buffer inventory and the existence of prod-
uct quality standards for analysing finished product
quality. Manufacturers routinely hold their own buffer
inventories of raw materials, API, and to some extent,
finished product. If they have adequate incentives, for
example, through forecast commitments, manufacturers
could hold higher amounts of inventory at each of those
stages. The ACT manufacturing process is however,
market driven with heterogeneity in the quality of raw
material used (within certain tolerance limits specified
under regulatory filing), and each manufacturer may
have process parameters that have been stabilized over a
period of time to work with varying impurity levels.
Therefore, a centrally held API or raw material buffer is
not feasible even though it may be theoretically more
desirable. If a publicly funded buffer inventory exists to
meet short-term mismatches in demand and supply at
the country level, the buffer inventory should comprise
finished products and not raw material or API.
Financial buffer fund for ACT
Financing buffers including emergency contingency
funds can be very effectively used to initiate ACT pro-
curement on time when temporary shortfalls in funding
threaten supply disruption. For example, the PEPFAR
and PMI programmes have established emergency com-
modity funds that provide countries with rapid access to
financial resources in the event that Global Fund disbur-
sements are delayed [47,49]. Countries accessing the
buffer are expected to replenish the fund as resources
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become available. UNICEF also uses a similar line of
credit for vaccines [45].
Another example of an initiative that provides bridge
financing to grant recipients on the basis of pending aid
commitments so that they can procure essential com-
modities while awaiting donor funding is the Pledge
Guarantee for Health, conceived by the Bill & Melinda
Gates Foundation, the Reproductive Health Supplies
Coalition, Dalberg Global Development Advisors, and
the United Nations Foundation [51].
Financial buffers are easy to implement and may
require less oversight and administrative burden com-
pared to product buffers. Countries accessing financing
buffers have the freedom to select the manufacturer
and product that best meet their requirements and are
not limited to just stock-piled products. Challenges
associated with establishing financing buffers include a
significant risk of de-capitalizing the buffer due to repay-
ment default by a country. Decisions to release funds
must be made quickly, and as a result, sufficient due dili-
gence may not always be possible. Financial buffers rely
on the finished product being readily available and do
not present any of the lead time or pricing benefits
that can result from establishing a physical buffer. In
addition, they create a parallel mechanism for releasing
funds; bypassing and potentially undermining existing
processes as well as removing the mechanism to enforce
conditions related to under-performance. Creation of a
separate mechanism rather than tapping into an existing
structure also requires seed financing and the identifica-
tion of a body to host and implement the mechanism.
Options for stabilizing the artemisinin market in the
long term
In addition to better matching of demand and supply
for ACT, it is imperative to stabilize the market for arte-
misinin. Several methods for doing this can be con-
sidered but each requires a medium- to long-term
impact outlook and may not be implementable in the
short-term.
Sanofi-Aventis is expected to launch a semi-synthetic
variant of artemisinin in 2013 [52] which would reduce
the lead time of artemisinin from the current 7 months
agriculturally to only a few days in the reactor. While
exact figures on price and quantity available are not
reported in any published literature, according to recent
reports [12] an estimated 50 metric tons of semi-
synthetic artemisinin will be available in 2013 at a price
between US$ 350-400/kg. While this technology has the
potential for stabilizing the market if scaled-up, the sup-
ply in the immediate term will only have a small impact
on the overall artemisinin market. Therefore, other com-
plementary interventions will still be required to address
the uncertainties in the artemisinin market.
Voluntary standards for extractors
To bring greater transparency to the artemisinin extrac-
tion and the leaf collection business, a voluntary stand-
ard could be created for extractors that would involve
adherence to both appropriate purchasing and sales
practices and minimum quality or impurity thresholds.
Such a standard could be established by an independent
standard-setting agency or a consortium of partners that
would monitor the extractors to ensure socially respon-
sible business practices and quality in the artemisinin
production process.
Large purchasers such as PMI and Global Fund would
then ensure that ACT manufacturers from whom they
purchase source their artemisinin only from extractors
who have opted to meet the voluntary quality standard.
This standard would reduce the number of participating
extractors and in turn simplify the API supply chain and
result in fewer, and more responsible, extractors that
meet standards of product quality as well as better sell-
ing and pricing practices [12]. This mechanism would
not be intended to standardize artemisinin quality speci-
fications across all manufacturers, but instead would
only allow extractors who engage in responsible sour-
cing, pricing and selling practices. This would create
both price stability in the market as well as allowing
manufacturers to engage in forward purchasing without
the risk of extractors reneging their contracts.
Better information sharing mechanism across the
supply chain
In the long term, if agriculturally grown artemisia is to
be the main source of artemisinin, a robust mechanism
needs to be developed that leads to better information
sharing among farmers, extractors, and manufacturers
regarding artemisia growth, artemisinin sales, and fore-
casts. Decision-making across the ACT supply chain
needs to become less reliant on the intermediaries
and market signals received from single parties. A
technology-supported information exchange platform
should be designed that can provide anticipated demand
information directly to artemisia farmers in the main
growing areas. Farmers in artemisia growing areas can
receive up-to-date information on demand, climate
change, and farming practices, and communicate their
needs to other invested parties [12]. Such methods of
providing better demand and price information to farm-
ers have been commonly used to eliminate middle-men
and stabilize prices in other agricultural sourcing mar-
kets including the ITC e-Choupal programme [53].
Conclusions
Universal access and use of diagnostics would help us
understand the true burden of malaria and allow better
visibility of the true demand for ACT creating a better
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forecast. Accurate forecasting information from the
country level will enable a closer matching of global de-
mand and supply; however, this will require significant
investments in national health system strengthening
which are unlikely in the short-term. Better grant man-
agement and disbursement at the Global Fund as a part
of its new funding model will also relieve some of the
pressures on the ACT supply chain, especially with
respect to financing delays. However, many challenges
will persist and a mix of strategies will be required to
stabilize the artemisinin and ACT market.
Physical buffer stocks are best suited to deal with pro-
curement and supply management and global supply
challenges, while a financial approach better addresses
funding disruptions. For example, if a stock-out is
created because a country does not have the funding
available to purchase products when needed, access to
readily available financial resources would be more bene-
ficial than access to a physical buffer (which the country
may not be able to draw from in the absence of con-
firmed or guaranteed capital).
On the other hand, poor procurement and supply
management capabilities may prevent a country from
anticipating stock-outs far enough in advance for a
financial option to be effective. In this case, a physical
product buffer would be more appropriate, since
product would be readily available and can be quickly
accessed.
While the availability of synthetic and semi-synthetic
artemisinin may ease some market pressures [52], the
projected quantity to be produced in the short-term [12]
is unlikely to create a significant rebalancing of the sup-
ply chain. Therefore, a physical regional buffer held by a
third party to fill orders with short lead-time windows
will be needed to provide a temporary solution. Seed fi-
nancing will be needed to develop the initial stockpile,
which can be replenished when orders are placed, enab-
ling a supply chain linked to both forecasts and actual
demand. Efforts must be made to create a rolling
horizon forecast commitment model that is feasible
within the legal boundaries of the donors. Such a
model would incorporate minimum but flexible
purchase quantities over a defined period of time that
embodies the core principles of the strategies
outlined. The regional buffer should be considered
short to medium term solutions. Developing better
medium- to long-term investments to streamline
country-level processes and supply chain management
would ultimately make such a buffer redundant. In
addition, for countries that are faced with significant
disbursement delays, financial buffers that provide
bridge funding need to be considered. These financial
buffers must ensure a short lead time to mobilise
resources for procurement.
In the medium to long term, to bring greater transpar-
ency to the artemisinin extraction and the leaf collection
business, a voluntary standard should be created for
extractors to ensure appropriate purchasing and sales
practices. In addition, minimum thresholds should be
established leading to high quality products and an
adherence to a minimum ethical standards. At the same
time, significant investments in country level system
strengthening will be required to minimize demand
uncertainties at the national level. Streamlining donor
processes for fund disbursement and developing better
information exchange standards among farmers, extrac-
tors, and manufacturers from the agricultural process to
sales and purchasing will prevent the bullwhip effect
arising from country level demand variability to ensure
that decision making is not based on inaccurate market
signals and ultimately enable a better matching of supply
and demand.
Additional file
Additional file 1: Analysis of approaches for better matching of
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